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MONEY-GO-ROUND: PERSONAL ECONOMIES OF
WEALTH, ASPIRATION AND INDEBTEDNESS
Deborah James
The citizen protests that erupted in North Africa and theMiddle East during 2011
prompt one to ask what might happen in the aftermath of such events. Long after
the news cameras have switched to focus on other stories, how do people enjoy
the freedom they have gained? In South Africa the democratic transition was
much celebrated worldwide for liberating the previously disenfranchised. But
subsequent developments, particularly the switch from the liberation movement’s
earlier alignment with Moscow to a neo-liberal economy, seemed to imply this
would be a freedom less to exercise political choice than to consume. As one
prominent African National Congress member – and government spokesman –
said, ‘I didn’t join the revolution to be poor’ (Posel 2009). The media tell us that
what are consumed are often glitzy and even kitsch goods and branded products.
This outcome sounds different from what many might have expected, although of
course it would be paternalistic to want to deny others the right to what is freely
available to those in the world of mainstream capitalism. The down side is that
this freedom entails, and has been accompanied by, something that looks like a
very deﬁnite unfreedom: massive levels of consumer indebtedness, growing from
more than R350 billion in 2002, with an average interest rate of 26 per cent
per annum, to the 2006 level of R680 billion, with an interest rate on short-term
loans of 360 per cent per annum. By 2008 the ﬁgure had grown to R1.1 trillion
(R10=approx £1) (du Plessis 2007: 79).
This stark picture requires qualiﬁcation, however. The people who turn out to
be most in debt are not the poorest of the poor, but the ‘black diamonds’: the
upwardly mobile and fast-growing African middle class, which in 2007 was
reported to have grown by 30 per cent in just over a year.1 The things for which
they get into debt are not only ﬂashy goods and branded clothes, or expensive
cars, but often items of much greater long-term worth and value. Investments are
deemed necessary in life-course events like marriage (and bridewealth), in death
(and funerals). Higher education is now deemed a necessity. The former were long
considered essential, but have become more costly. Massively expanded demand
for the latter, coupled with an absence of state funding or bursaries, has caused a
particularly severe drain on households’ resources. Having undergone the pain of
oppression and the exhilaration of freedom, people ﬁnd that what they value most
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is also what has caused their considerable indebtedness, with all the attendant
unsustainability, anxiety and even shame that this entails.
However global a force, neo-liberalism, with its contradictory intersection of
state and market forces, has consequences that differ widely from one setting to
another. Those aspects of the liberated life which are valued in South Africa, the
debt into which people get in order to acquire these, and the measures undertaken
by the state to address this social problem of debt, have a very particular
character. Such regulatory measures arise in a society somewhat out of kilter with
what is occurring in the rest of the world. As Hobsbawm observed, the end of the
twentieth century was a time when all programmes for improving the affairs of
the human race seemed to have failed (1994: 563) and when citizens had become
increasingly marginalized and unlikely to participate in formal political processes.
Yet just at this belated moment South Africans had been offered democracy,
and its accompanying restitutive and reform-oriented measures, often with a
strong racial underpinning. They were seized by the idea that a state remedy might
set right the earlier, racially determined wrongs which had been brought about by
state and market in collusion. The discussion of debt in this article is set against
the longer history of exploitation of South African black people by the forces
of capitalism, in which they were not only paid bottom dollar but also sold
low-quality goods, especially furniture, on hire purchase and at high interest.
Before the credit crunch had become a matter of daily discussion in the rest
of the world, overindebtedness was a matter of huge concern in South Africa. Its
status as a kind of moral panic was evident in the early 2000s from business
pages in the major newspapers and from radio phone-in programmes. All
contained heart-rending stories of the kind that have now become familiar
globally. In a manner that is classically South African, yet recognizably global,
proposed solutions revealed a strong ‘market-driven’ orientation, combined
with attempts at regulation by both state and society. Both the supply of and the
demand for credit received attention. Human rights and civil society organiz-
ations strove to curb demand by teaching budgeting skills – implying that if
people tightened their belts, stopped spending money on the lottery, and learned
to live within their means, all would be well. At the same time, a new piece of
legislation, the National Credit Act (2007), was passed. Debated in Parliament
over the course of almost a decade –with submissions by churches, trade unions,
civil society organizations, human rights and legal aid centres, and citizens’ advice
bureaux – it aimed to control supply by curbing ‘reckless lending’. Proposals were
formulated to clip the wings of banks, clothing and furniture stores, the recently
proliferating microlenders, and even mashonisas (loansharks),2 while offering
debt counselling to the victims of these lenders.
South Africa was, in the past, a country where the denial or transgression of
citizen rights was always quick to excite or provoke a concerted response. Post-
apartheid, this remains the case in some respects, as evidenced by multiple
2The Zulu word mashonisa relates to the verb stems -shona (to sink/become poor/die) and
-shonisa (to impoverish; to cause to be poor) (Dent and Nyembezi 1969: 481). It may be translated
as ‘one who impoverishes’ or who ‘takes and continues to take indeﬁnitely’ (Krige 2011: 144). In
popular parlance the plural is mashonisas (ibid.: 151; Siyongwana 2004: 851).
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protests during the 2000s over lack of ‘service delivery’, or the 2010 nation-wide
public sector strike by the trade union body COSATU. But, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, indebtedness is not the subject of such concerted action. Related to the
individualized character of upward mobility and to the competitiveness and envy
that are said to accompany this, debt is often considered a problem to be endured
in solitude. Its proposed solutions also serve to atomize. Debt counsellors,
ombudsmen, and consumer columns in the newspaper make their contribution by
aiding individuals who have got into trouble, but none propose collective action.
The broader political/economic context of South Africa is one in which
divergent elements merge. Post-apartheid, like post-socialism, means harking
after an earlier period with its state-corporate economy, its former large-scale
employment for all, and the effectiveness of an authoritarian state which delivered
some welfare. The effects of liberalization are combined with, or mediated by, the
existence of a redistributive or distributional regime (Seekings and Nattrass 2006;
Bähre 2011). Marking the transition to a neo-liberal order most clearly, a period
of large-scale employment when migrant remittances were the key source of
moneys for ‘distribution’ has given way to mass unemployment and dependence
by many on welfare payments (see Ferguson 2007; 2009). Ferguson claims that
South Africa’s newly disconnected poor are petitioning to be reincorporated
within the body politic, by making ‘declarations of dependence’: but that welfare
payments, although widespread, are unable to create the kind of social belonging
for which the poor are petitioning, since they provide only a ‘thin’ incorporation
(2010). The present article extends the analysis to explore dependence on state
salaries alongside welfare payments, and includes, alongside the poorest, the
middle-income groups. They, too, have become involved in this distributional
regime, but in a quintessentially neo-liberal manner.
THE LONG AND THE SHORT TERMS
Relations of debt and credit in South Africa can be illuminated by Bloch and
Parry’s idea that, in particular transactional orders, social actors often convert
between shorter-term, more money-based exchanges and longer-term, more
moral ones (1989). The result is always patchy and plural, and the movement
towards complete formality never achieved. Multiple registers coexist, and
various logics drive people to attempt to convert relationships into cash-based
connections and back again. The way debt relationships modulate between
registers that are more and less formal, and more and less personal, may make
them more difﬁcult to analyse, however, than those of more instant exchange or
balanced reciprocity.
Such relationships ﬁt, in the anthropological canon, alongside others that are
said to be quintessentially ‘moral’ – that is, long-term – in character (Bloch and
Parry 1989). Practices relating to marriage and bridewealth are a key case. The
protracted and delayed transfer of wealth which occurred in the event of marriage
in South African traditional society (E. J. and J. D. Krige 1943) provides an
archetype of relations of indebtedness in their most long-term form. This ideal
still holds true, as Impalahoek village resident Solomon Mahlaba pointed out:
People have been in debt since time immemorial. . . . In marriage, when I pay lobola,
I don’t pay the whole amount. I am in debt – I owe the family of my wife. They have the
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right to follow me up, and send people, even to send the chief to collect the debt. . . .They
might even allow you to have children, and when your ﬁrst daughter gets married, you
are paid lobola for your daughter, you will then use these cattle to pay your in-laws. . . .3
According to this view, one ought never to borrow money in order to make
marriage payments, since these are in and of themselves relations of social
obligation. This statement, while revealing the existence of a continuing ideal,
conceals changes which have long transformed such relationships. The trans-
formation has accelerated recently, however, with the ready availability of
consumer credit. A prospective son-in-law, faced with the need for a momentous
cash payment from demanding in-laws, will on occasion borrow from formal
ﬁnancial institutions, and sometimes from illegal moneylenders, in order to be
able to meet his obligations. As discussed later, it is not only marriage but a set of
other key moments in the life course, especially the need for higher education,
which necessitate this.
What was, then, an embedded social arrangement becomes an equally long-
term, but more formally exchange-based, interest-bearing and impersonal one. Of
note in this contrast is not the commodiﬁcation of bridewealth itself, but the way
it necessitates expenditure for which credit of a less personalized kind may be
sought, and granted. What were previously – and are still ideally conceptualized
as – investments in social relations, now might require a prospective groom to be
‘in hock’, either to the bank or to informal moneylenders, or both. The delay in
payment that previously signiﬁed an embedded and trust-based kind of relation
has now come to connote payment through formal channels, using the quasi-
invisible conduit of the bank account, as I will demonstrate.
CREDIT AND DEBT: ASSUMPTIONS QUESTIONED
In efforts made to tackle the ‘demand’ side of credit, the prevailing rhetoric points
to overindebted black consumers as the primary focus of concern and object of
state regulatory measures. Recent surveys reveal that the people most indebted
after 1995 were those in the middle of the scale. This is
most likely because this is where full-time employed workers enter the labour market.
Because these workers earn a regular salary, they qualify for credit, but binding
expenditure constraints possibly places pressure on them to borrow at a level that is
unsustainable. (Daniels 2004: 842)
Race, here, is not a deﬁning feature. But it is salaried workers, especially the black
African recipients of state salaries (nurses, teachers, policemen) in South Africa’s
new black middle class where public sector employment predominates
(Schlemmer 2005), and middle-level employees in state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), whose ‘problem borrowing’ is of most concern. Members of this group
have had the greatest electoral and political inﬂuence since the advent of
democracy.
3Interview, Solomon Mahlaba, Impalahoek, 16 August 2008. Pseudonyms have been used for
the village, and for some informants.
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If anxiety about problem borrowing was thus focused on the newly
enfranchised members of South Africa’s public service, the attempted regulation
of ‘supply’ focused in particular on a group whose establishment of small-scale
lending enterprises had been a response to its own recent disenfranchisement –
that is, white Afrikaans-speakers. The moment of South Africa’s democracy
had been marked by the quite extraordinary liberalizing of credit provision.
In 1992, a clause in the Usury Act, limiting the interest rate on small loans under
R6,000 with a repayment period of less than thirty-six months, was removed,
facilitating a range of aggressive credit-marketing strategies. Besides the large
banks, vehicle ﬁnance companies, and clothing and food stores, ‘microﬁnance’
entrepreneurs stepped in to offer a new source of credit through businesses
that extended small loans to poorer people. It was to curb these galloping
excesses, to which the lifting of the clause had initially given free rein, that the Act
now belatedly attempted to shut the stable doors. To state matters simply: the
public service had been newly restaffed by black Africans, leaving many of its
former white/Afrikaner employees to seek alternative ways of making a living.
Many of them did so by moving into the microﬁnance industry – as well as
initiating pyramid schemes (see Krige, this volume). State moneys were ﬂowing
into the bank accounts of black civil servants, from which white, mostly
Afrikaans, entrepreneurs were trying to divert them. While it achieved some
success here, the Act proved unable to regulate the activities of informal
loansharks or mashonisas, who became even more ubiquitous, charging higher
rates of interest than previously. It is mainly on their activities that this article
focuses.
Restitutive ideologies underpin the measures attempted by the state to address
the problem of indebtedness; but these measures have foundered, partly
because they are based on ﬂawed assumptions which often threaten to derail the
very solutions they are proposing. Such measures presume a classic distinction
between borrowers and lenders with a separate regulatory strategy appropriate
for each, rather than recognizing their interdependence and mutually
reinforcing character. They presume that if people are better informed they
will behave in a more rational/modern manner. They ignore the fact that illegal
and unregistered lending practices, already in existence for a century or more,
are continuing or intensifying. Finally, they overlook continuities between
earlier causes of indebtedness and current ones, by attributing the latter to the
advent of democracy and the ﬁnancial liberalization and market freedom that
accompanied it.
When designing my research, I needed to recognize the fact that an aspirational
ethic is neither restricted to the ‘new middle’ or ‘black diamond’ class,
nor constrained within primarily urban settings. To rely on objective realities of
income would be to ignore that the increased promise since democracy of
‘accelerated social mobility, if not its realization, is a vivid one’ (James 2011: 334).
If this middle class was based on longer trajectories of education and investment
but has recently had its expectations consolidated and actualized by a
paternalistic and patrimonial state (Krige 2011), then the ranks of those
who long to join it considerably outnumber those who might be said objectively
to belong. Research for this article thus involved participant observation
and interview-based research in three settings: among members of the new
managerial class in South Africa’s public service; in the low- to middle-income
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neighbourhood of Protea Glen in Soweto; and in Impalahoek village in
Mpumalanga.4
The separation of borrower from lender
Attempts to regulate the credit market presuppose that South African consumers
can be subdivided into clearly demarcated and deﬁnable categories, and that
better understanding each of these segments will allow for appropriate policy on
tackling indebtedness for each of them. They assume that microlenders who
charge excessive interest – shading at one end into informal moneylenders
or mashonisas – are a deﬁnable and targetable group, contrasted with those who
borrow from them. The tentative continuum outlined below shows that, although
such assumptions are partly true, they ignore areas of informal lending where
borrowers and lenders merge.
At one end of the continuum are big loansharks, who typically lend amounts of
R1,000 (about £100) or more and charge monthly interest of 50 per cent. What
distinguishes them is that they lend only to people with regular, mostly civil
service salaries, securing the loan by conﬁscating borrowers’ ATM cards and
using these to withdraw the money owed to them at month end before returning
them to their owners. Typically, borrowers, shorter of money than previously,
then borrow again, once again yielding up their ATM cards. This results in a kind
of debt-bondage cycle often called ‘working for mashonisa’. Initially borrowers
tried to escape by cancelling their ATM cards at the bank and applying for new
ones, but loansharks hit back, securing their interests by conﬁscating borrowers’
ID books as well (it is impossible to get a new ATM card without an ID book).
Loansharks combine moneylending with other economic activities: one worked
as a foreman/manager for a white farmer; another owns a village store; some
combine their activities with work in the public service, often lending to fellow
workers or positioning themselves outside the gates of labour compounds at
month end to offer loans to their inmates.5 One borrower went from being an
apprentice lender, having owed money to a big loanshark for several years until
he ﬁnally managed to ‘set himself free’ and start his own, part-time, moneylending
business; another became a store owner on the strength of his earnings.
At the other end one might place small-time loansharks, who lend amounts of
less than R300 (about £30), charge about 15 per cent interest, are less stringent in
the calculation of interest over time, and have no formal system of collateral
such as retaining customers’ ATM cards. One Impalahoek lender, Samuel Kgore,
had a characteristically complex package of income sources. He started as a
gambler in, and later as the ‘owner’ of, a dice-board gambling operation: one of
a number of micro-businesses that surround the pay-point on pension day.
He loaned people money with which to gamble or, when they borrowed from big
mashonisas in order to play dice and were unable to pay back, lent them small
amounts to help get them out of trouble. His clients are pensioners, people with
‘piece work’ (hourly paid) jobs herding cattle for pensioners, or self-employed
builders or brickmakers. An additional source of income was later provided by his
4For more on Impalahoek see Niehaus 2001. My thanks to Isak Niehaus for introducing me to
friends in the village.
5On illegal moneylenders see Roth (2004); Siyongwana (2004).
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state disability grant, starting in 2007 and serving further to consolidate a
complex livelihood strategy, comprising a series of small sequential steps. After
receiving the grant, Samuel buys chicken feet to barbecue by the roadside, which
generates some money for loaning, the interest on which enables him to buy more
chicken feet. The dice game both depends upon but also helps to fund these
other income streams. There is a certain logic in his separating of ‘capital’ from
‘interest’: ‘my gains, I just put in my pocket, and the original money that I lent
them, I lend again’. Seen in market terms, small lenders do not compete with
larger ones; their products are distinct and aimed at a different market.6
Positioned somewhere along the scale, a more generalized moneylending is
pervasive in urban townships and small-town settings in the former homelands
(see Krige 2011: 136–81; Roth 2004; Siyongwana 2004). Its ubiquity – and relative
invisibility – became evident when I asked a young woman university student
to help me interview a mashonisa in Orange Farm. She returned a few days
later, revealing that, previously unbeknown to her, her own mother was lending
money informally. Such lenders, operating beyond the system and aware of the
illegality of their activities, were nonetheless aiming at greater economic formality
themselves. Ironically, policy makers’ attempts to ‘bank the unbanked’ (Porteous
and Hazelhurst 2004; for Ghana, see Breckenridge 2010) were here at odds with
state regulation of illegal moneylending. Daphney Neke, a teacher of ﬁnancial
literacy, was often asked by small-scale lenders for advice on how to bank their
own proceeds and securely store the proceeds of their enterprise without drawing
attention to its illicit character.7
Most comprehensively combining the activities of borrower and lender are
credit-granting savings clubs, known as Accumulated Savings and Credit
Associations or ASCRAs in the literature (Ardener 2010; Bähre 2007) but locally
as stokvel or sesebesebe. Although many such clubs engage in elaborate rituals
where they pool commodities such as soap powder (see Figures 1 and 2), others
have a more overtly ﬁnancial orientation and purpose. Explicitly exempted from
the NCA, on the grounds of their being embedded in ‘African tradition’ although
many were founded recently, they charge interest of around 30 per cent, do not
keep borrowers’ ATM cards and thus have no collateral other than ‘trust’. In
Impalahoek, a range of new savings or rotating credit clubs had been started by
government employees, especially female teachers and nurses. Moneys collected
on themonthly payday from eachmember, instead of being simply distributed as a
lump sum to each in turn on a rotating basis, were being loaned out, either to
members or their friends, colleagues or relatives. ‘Build Yourselves, Relatives’, for
example, was started by a teacher. It had nine members, with each contributing
R1,000 (£100) a month. Each took it in turn to borrow the pooled money at
30 per cent interest or loan it out to friends or neighbours, and defaulting members
were charged next month as though they had borrowed the outstanding amount.
Relying on ‘trust’ brings varied results, depending on the group in question: most
had experienced problems with fraud, or non-payment by certain members.
From this variety of types of informal lending, it can be seen that, except
perhaps at the extreme ends of the continuum, borrowers and lenders cannot be
6Interview, Samuel Kgore, Impalahoek, 22 August 2008.
7Interview, Daphney Neke, Kagiso Trust, Johannesburg, 15 April 2010.
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separated easily. Some start as one and later become the other; some are both, but
at different times and in different registers. This blurring, somewhat akin to
the conversion between longer- and shorter-term registers discussed by Bloch
and Parry (1989), is widely recognized in the literature on informal ﬁnancial
arrangements (Shipton 2007, 2009; Guyer and Stiansen 1999; Guerin, Morvant-
Roux and Servet 2010) but is often assumed to apply only in rural communities
FIGURE 1 Members of an Impalahoek sesebesebe perform a ritual of giving at a
member’s house
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and among the marginalized. In South Africa it prevails increasingly among the
upwardly mobile, and civil servants in particular. The National Credit Act has
been largely powerless in the face of informal moneylending and associated
informal credit arrangements. Although the existence of the Act, and its
associated rhetoric, are widely known, its workings are said not to have ‘reached
the Lowveld’ or ‘the townships’, even – or especially –where those involved are
from the new middle class.
The novelty of consumer credit
A second key assumption, concerned more with the lending practices of large
corporations than with the newer microlenders, is that black consumers were
precipitously introduced to ﬁnancial institutions and formal credit at the moment
of democracy: and that, being ‘ﬁnancially illiterate’, they were powerless at
the hands of these predatory institutions. On the contrary, many have had a
generation or more of exposure to credit, often in its most rapacious form
(Porteous and Hazelhurst 2004). (One aspect of this was the widespread
granting – often illegally – by magistrates of ‘emoluments attachment’ or
‘garnishee orders’ which enable creditors automatically to deduct payment from
debtors’ bank accounts at a 5 per cent charge; see GTZ 2008.) Dogged by these
practices of ‘credit apartheid’, and by the charging of extremely high interest,
many had nonetheless succeeded in buying furniture, item by item, on hire
purchase. It was reforming the terms offered by furniture stores that had been a
key aim of the National Credit Act. Although furniture was overtaken in the
1990s by clothing, vehicles and other goods, many of the same practices
persist. This experience caused some consumers to ‘retreat’ from formal lending
institutions, instead building new institutions for self-reliant borrowing/lending.
One such person was the Impalahoek teacher who had founded ‘Build
Yourselves, Relatives’. It had started as a pure savings club with no loan facilities.
What had prompted the move into moneylending was members’ keenness to
escape from the clutches of stores that sell furniture on hire purchase: ‘I wanted to
prevent members from buying goods on credit. At the end of the year, you can
buy what you want with cash,’ said the founder. He considered himself to have
been wronged by a furniture store when a garnishee order had been placed on his
bank account – at signiﬁcant cost – for allegedly missing a monthly repayment.
He had contested this, but his enquiries had yielded no results. To avoid such
situations in future, he and other members were now aiming to put together a
sizeable cash sum on the annual date when each one’s turn came, so as to be able
to buy items of furniture, electrical appliances, building materials, a car – or (in
the case of other members, and reﬂecting the aspirational character of the times)
to pay for summer holidays at beach resorts. At this point they tried a range of
banks, and later the Post Ofﬁce, as a means to pursue their new investment
strategy, but never succeeded in being paid the advertised interest on their savings.
It was for this reason that they started lending to members, and – in turn – to
relatives or friends of those members. They still used their bank account, but as a
repository for funds rather than a source of interest.
This aversion to the worst aspects of the formal lending sector was an outcome
of the distorted version of the market rooted in an earlier period, before the
advent of democracy or the neo-liberal moment proper. Such arrangements
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caused consumers to distrust the ‘formal’ system, but they did not abandon it
completely.
Competitiveness, status and secrecy
Closely linked to the assumption about the effects of the precipitous introduction
of credit in the 1990s is another that posits black people as having been newly
subjected, at the moment of democracy, to pressures to consume useless and
unimportant luxury goods: if only these could be curbed, frugality would prevail
and people would start to live within their means. There are some truths in this
assumption: but it fails to recognize how the most important kinds of expenditure
for the new middle class (glossed as the ‘black diamonds’) are not frivolous but
rather encompass investments now regarded as mandatory. These include both
the shorter-term expenses of weddings, and the longer-term ones, more like
investments, in marriage payments, funerals, and higher education. While some
informants were ready to stay single in order to escape from the conspicuous
consumption associated with getting married, none denied that the expense
occasioned by education to a higher level had been essential to their own success.
Upward mobility, the associated ‘competition’ arising out of status anxiety and
the fear of gossip, and the likelihood that marrying out of one’s class might
exacerbate such anxieties, are in fact longstanding themes in South Africa. The
Tikieline Yuppie, a novel byMehlaleng Mosotho, shows how these processes were
experienced in the 1980s. Its Sowetan protagonist, Tseke, the upwardly mobile,
FIGURE 2 The chairman of an Impalahoek sesebesebe counts up members’
contributions of soap powder
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university-educated son of a lowly domestic worker mother, has a job as a
salesman in a cleaning products corporation. He spends some of his earnings on
upgrading his matchbox house, and buys on hire purchase a ‘TV, a music system
and carpets for the lounge and the two bedrooms’. As a result his mother decides
she could at last invite the members of her savings club back to the house: she says
they used to ‘nudge each other’
whenever they came here, saying ‘look at her, this thing with dirty feet that look like the
ground they walk on, how can she call us to a house full of furniture that white people
threw out for chickens to roost in?’ I want them to see that my son has made me to be like
other people.
In his heart, Tseke rejoiced that his mother was going to show those women and shut up
the mouths that never stop going up and down (Mosotho 1998: 66).
His impending marriage to a woman he’d met while at university puts him
under immense pressure. His future in-laws have niceties of behaviour and rules
about good manners which alert him to the fact that they claim to be of superior
status to his own family. This sense of inadequacy makes him vulnerable when he
takes his ﬁancée shopping and she insists on buying shoes and a dress which are
inordinately expensive. When he objects, she clinches the argument by saying,
‘I won’t allow you to shame me on my wedding day. I don’t want township
gossips to cure their boredom with my name.’ Experiencing a sense of panic, and
against his better judgement, he nonetheless agrees to the purchases, using both
the credit card which he had just been granted, and his year-end bonus.
These experiences of peer pressure have been intensiﬁed by the strategies of
advertisers, more far-reaching now than they were in the 1980s. Consumers
now have mobile phones which makes them easy targets for advertisers, and
companies are reported to have little compunction about giving out information
to other marketers. ‘People are pressurized by competition in the township; if
someone has something, someone else will want to have, without considering
the cost,’ said one respondent. Another pointed out that ‘some people want to be
equal with other people’, while a third stated that ‘people are challenged by other
people, the pressure comes from society’. Under such pressures, people were said
to relinquish their view of the longer term, abandon prudence and frugality, and
spend unearned money: ‘people cannot wait and budget, they are in a hurry
for everything’. One person observed that the advantage of credit is ‘you can
immediately get what you need without any delays’ while the disadvantage is that
‘you are working backwards instead of progressing. . . . People are just quick to get
things without calculating the cost.’8 What distinguishes debt from exchange is a
time lapse between the moment of acquisition and the moment of repayment
(Hart 2000: 200). The delay, the time after the purchase has been made, is when
one might regret one’s action in buying the longed-for item.
A well-paid ofﬁcer in a government department put these consumerist
aspirations down to the fact that people want to be seen to have the same things
as other people. Where his view was that ‘some of us are too inclined to worry
8Various interviews, Protea Glen, Soweto, August 2009.
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about what others think’, Sophie Chevalier (personal communication) found
that those consuming a new range of commodities can be uncertain about what to
buy, taking refuge in repeating the choices of others around them. She compares
this to the behaviour of new consumers in the US in the 1920s who were keen to
‘belong’.
Accompanying conspicuous consumption is a sense of shame about getting
into debt; and particularly about having the furniture store come to one’s house
to repossess a fridge, stove, or, more recently, car. ‘People are ashamed and so
would not share their experiences with others’ said someone who was trying to
explain the individualizing character of consumerism and its failure to generate a
collective sense of ‘rights’. A correlative to the intense ‘competition’, of which
many speak even if not all give in to it, is the secrecy and stigma that accompanies
indebtedness. The same pride and desire for respectability that motivated Tseke’s
mother at last to invite her club members to the house once it had decent
furniture, means that those who ﬁnd themselves ‘in over their heads’ are reluctant
to talk about it or to establish – in conversation with others – a commonality of
experience. This is one reason why various extraordinarily unscrupulous practices
of those glossed as ‘credit providers’ go unchallenged.
While acknowledging the very real sense of peer pressure which these various
examples suggest, and while recognizing the temptations offered by ready loans,
one should also be wary of the stereotypes. Although there is a prevalent idea
that ‘black diamonds’ get into debt because of excessive, even ill-considered
expenditure and ‘competition’, several informants, while bemoaning these
horrors of consumerism, displayed sage and prudent ﬁnancial acumen in their
own lives. Many who had taken out personal loans had done so to pay for their
own or their children’s education rather than because of yielding to the pressures
of ‘competition’ over possession of sofas or shoes with brand names.
Take Mrs Magubane. She and her husband are waged employees of the state-
owned enterprise (SOE) Spoornet, and parents of two children of schoolgoing age
and one postgraduate student. (He, incidentally, is also a loanshark.) She spoke
with frustration of being bombarded with offers of store cards, insurance deals
and ‘free’mobile phone airtime by a variety of companies. She had not, however,
fallen prey to any of these. On the contrary, she was aware of the dangers of
rampant consumerism and of the credit required to sustain it. She described
friends with
wallets full of store cards – Foschini, Truworths – and it is a problem when the end of the
month comes. . . . They only earn R3,000 a month. Go to Truworths, they wear nice
clothes, fashions . . . now, it is summer, there are winter sales. . . . One person in
Truworths has R5,000 credit, at Foschini another R3,000. When they count, they will
owe R50,000. When it comes to groceries, it is the 15th, 16th of the month, they will have
no money.
Such consumers, she said, are reduced to buying food on credit: they ‘swipe the
card – even for bread’. She, in contrast, had chosen to pursue a prudent strategy of
investing in the education of her children above all else.
My ﬁrst priority is that ‘you must go to school. I want to be proud of you.’ They criticize
me for what I wear. But . . . I want to be proud of my children. I try by all means to pay
the little money I can.
31ECONOMIES OF ASPIRATION AND INDEBTEDNESS
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Sep 2013 IP address: 91.240.2.62
It was these priorities that typically got people in over their heads. Keen to help
educate the children, she had been persuaded by a salesman to buy a series of
books on Maths Literacy on hire purchase. After she had almost completed the
instalment payments, the debit orders mysteriously ceased – only to recommence
some years later, when she was told she owed R5,000. It was the most far-sighted
expenditures, ones which in Bloch and Parry’s terms represent an ‘investment’ in
the long term, which had the very real potential to land people in unsustainable
levels of debt. In order to engage in such morally signiﬁcant transactions, they
were ending up with long-term, less-than-moral ones, laden with neighbourhood
opprobrium.
In their attempts to rectify the situation, people were being forced into further
indebtedness at the hands of loansharks. This gives the lie to another common
stereotype: that those modern or well-off enough to have credit cards and vehicle
ﬁnance have no need of loans from informal lenders. On the contrary, people
often use such a lender as a last resort: the ﬁnal option when all others have
already been explored, undertaken in addition to, not instead of these other
options. It is these new, non-optative forms of expenditure which pressurize them
into doing so. Most expensively, it is higher or further education that is now
considered mandatory, and which can involve taking out loans from money-
lenders once other sources of credit prove impossible to access. The major
difference between this and the previous generation, and the biggest single new
expenditure making credit a necessity, was that many in Mpumalanga and
Soweto had not had further or higher education, but virtually all felt it was
mandatory to send three or four children to college or university. This was what
induced one schoolteacher to approach a loanshark, after having exhausted all
other more formal sources of credit, and in addition to her loans from these
sources. It was those families whose parents had not themselves been middle-
class, property-owning, or well-educated who seemed to be most likely to get into
serious debt on this account.
General proﬂigacy is thus acknowledged and condemned, but disavowed
in particular cases. Jonathan, working in a well-paid managerial job in a
government department, spoke of what he saw as a skewed value system that led
his cousins to spend huge amounts on prestige items like expensive cars while
continuing to live crammed together in a small township house. He claimed to
prefer a more modest style of living. His friends had mocked him for continuing
to drive an old Toyota rather than buying a Mercedes. Echoing Tseke in
The Tikieline Yuppie, he wistfully pointed out, however, that particular pressure
to spend was most intensely exerted by prospective marriage partners. He
had more or less resigned himself to steering clear, at least in the short term, of
marriage for precisely this reason. In an attempt to remain free of formal/
impersonal debt bondage, he would now be steering clear of ‘long-term’, more
moral connections of the kind that might have tied him to future in-laws.
The solution: small-scale independent enterprise
Alongside frugality and belt tightening, the central rhetoric advocated as a means
to avoid indebtedness – and hence one means through which credit ‘demand’ is
tackled – is that people should earn their own money through individual initiative
and enterprise (see Krige, this volume) and become productive members of
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society independent of the state. This tacitly denies, but is perhaps also aimed at
transforming, the crucial fact that many of the people in this upwardly mobile
group are in fact public servants. But there are obstacles to becoming an
entrepreneur. Promising ‘business opportunities’ are undermined, causing many
to turn instead to moneylending, a more reliable source of income. Difﬁculties in
moving upwards, except via loansharking, are almost overdetermined.
One obstacle is the tenuousness of making a living which relies on the sale of,
and the willingness of other upwardly mobile to buy, the new ‘ﬁnancial products’
which are the topic of this article. The case of insurance salesmen is a good
illustration (see Bähre, this volume). While many township dwellers have been
ready to buy insurance policies, they are also likely to cancel these when times
are tough, as when they need a lump sum, or during the recession of the late
2000s. This inconstancy has disastrous effects on the economic situation of the
middlemen, often landing them in debt. Several people who had recently
approached Sisinyana Pholo, a debt counsellor, for advice, were insurance
salesmen. When their clients had cancelled policies, these brokers had fallen into
arrears with their payments on cars, houses and the like.9
A second obstacle to making a living as an entrepreneur is linked to ‘credit
apartheid’, and to the dual character of property ownership which obtained
before the advent of democracy in 1994, with Africans’ property rights
severely restricted. As was the case in other transitional societies such as those
in post-socialist Europe, the rapid social change that accompanied South Africa’s
democratization and liberalization entailed a marked change in property
relations. Where plots and houses were formerly held on a communal (in the
former homelands) or leasehold (in townships) basis, there has been a stated
intention, especially in the latter case, to switch to private property ownership.
Families formerly holding ‘old style’ council-built and -owned houses on the
basis of a 99-year lease have been given the title deeds. The effects have made for
unevenness. On the one hand the transfer of property from the state into
householders’ hands has led to a new market in real estate and a reported
property boom in some township areas. On the other, property has been
‘ringfenced’ by restraints such as banks’ reluctance to grant mortgages on some
township properties. Most importantly for the present argument, the transfer of
properties into private hands has been the basis of ﬁerce and bitter conﬂicts
in families, with former council houses now being viewed as family property, and
with the right of any single individual in such a family to ‘own’ a house being
hotly disputed (Krige 2011: 130–1).
With the advent of democracy, as aspirant homeowners scrambled to get on the
property ladder (after having previously restricted their borrowing to lesser items
such as furniture), involvement in market relations was sudden and precipitous.
The results were disastrous for those trying to make a living in property sales.
Frank Pule, an aspirant entrepreneur in Soweto, was trying to set up such a
business. He bought houses on auction in formerly white areas, where townhouses
in clusters were being sold off in the early 2000s, especially in areas south of
Johannesburg close to Soweto. That such houses were on the market he put down
to the aspirations – sometimes unrealistic – of the newly salaried classes who had
9Interview, Sisinyana Pholo, Midrand, 15 April 2010.
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recently moved out of Soweto, and to their desire for upward mobility. They had
‘got in over their heads’ and their new houses had been repossessed. ‘People don’t
know what it is like buying a house. They think “because I am working at SABC,
I will afford this house”.’ The ready availability of credit after 1994 had been a
factor inclining people to buy houses without giving it much thought. The sudden
bubble in the availability of credit just after democracy – a concomitant of
political and economic freedom – fuelled this process.
His buying and selling of these repossessed townhouses had originally seemed
to have considerable promise, but he in turn soon encountered problems. The
indebtedness of an initial swathe of house buyers had originally meant the ready
availability of such properties, but problems of debt had now worked their way
through the system. There were now fewer potential buyers in a second swathe
looking for townhouses. He was stuck with several which he was unable to sell.
African buyers had no further lines of credit, while white buyers no longer wanted
to live in the area.
He turned instead to buying and selling houses in Soweto. But memories of
family entitlement during apartheid spurred popular opposition to, and vigilante
action to prevent, any attempt to commoditize these ‘family houses’. What had
made some families newly vulnerable to repossession was the use of such houses
as surety when taking out subsequent mortgages to build extensions, and then
defaulting on them. While this sounds potentially traumatic for the occupants of
the putative house, it was more likely to spell disaster for an entrepreneur, such as
Frank, trying to proﬁt from the entry of such property onto the open market. He
and others in a similar position had quickly learnt the error of trying to sell a
repossessed Soweto house: ‘the history of that house keeps you out’. The family
‘won’t want to leave’. Neighbours knew the house as having belonged to a family
over several generations, and the owner, sensitive to matters of status and
competition, would have been secretive about having borrowed money from the
bank. ‘Now if the bank comes and says “we’re taking the house”, people look and
say “Hey, we know the great grandmother, et cetera, and now this is the fourth,
ﬁfth generation, there is no way these people can owe money.” ’ To attempt to sell
such a repossessed house was to invite the wrath of local vigilantes, as Frank had
found to his cost in one such case. Community activists had registered their
displeasure by dancing the toyi-toyi (an anti-apartheid activist dance) outside the
door, the owners had refused to move, and the sale had been aborted.10
Frustrated by the failure of his new real estate endeavour, one of the strategies to
which Frank had resorted recently was the lending of money in the manner which
I have described as pervasive.
It is puzzling that, while communal activism, or at least vigilantism, can be
expected in defence of the rights of former beneﬁciaries of apartheid’s skewed
form of state welfare, which provided houses, no similarly communal defence of
the rights of post-apartheid’s present-day beneﬁciaries, of a different type of state
patronage (that involving public service salaries), is in evidence. Where state-
provided houses were effectively ringfenced by community refusal to envisage
their sale on the open market, state salaries, supposedly a sign of political freedom
for those now newly employed in the public service, were not. Instead, the
10Interview, Soweto, 3 August 2008.
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recipients of these salaries were fair game to moneylenders and ‘credit providers’
of all kinds: ranging from informal loansharks to the furniture stores and other
unscrupulous corporations to whom many Africans had long been exposed, from
which those able to escape them had been warned off, but to which many
remained vulnerable.
There is an implicit assumption in accounts critical of ‘ﬁnancialization’,
described elsewhere in the world, that money ought rather to be made from
production (as in classic accounts of capitalism) rather than through investment,
lending, and the like. But moneymaking opportunities that are not somehow
dependent on ‘recruiting people’ in order to tap into their accounts are extremely
few and far between. Here is an unusual permutation of the famous ‘wealth in
people’ (Guyer 1993) for which Africa is known.
MAKING MONEY FROM NOTHING: THE MONEY-GO-ROUND
Market surveys show that it is generally salaried or waged people, often civil
servants in middle income brackets, who have been most liable to indebtedness.
One explanation for this is that both formal and illegal credit providers, reluctant
to expose themselves to the risk of non-repayment, are willing to lend only to
those who have a regular income. The former require a ‘payslip’ before agreeing
to offer credit, or can procure a ‘garnishee order’ from a magistrate. The latter do
the equivalent after the event, by conﬁscating the borrower’s ATM card (and ID
book) and withdrawing the money owed to them directly from the bank. What
these surveys less often reveal – since this happens below the radar – is that the
lenders to whom these salaried people are indebted are often salaried people too.
On the middle ground of the ‘lender continuum’ I mentioned earlier, people are
both borrowers and lenders simultaneously. But some important expenditures –
life cycle events like marriage, and funerals, or the need to put several children
through higher education – can tip a lender into being a borrower in the longer
term, and more inexorably. For such borrowers, a regular income stream turns
them into ‘prey’, with their salary being plundered at the end of every month.
Conversely, a regular stream of income becomes a basis for further extending that
income by those who lend money.
In this process of ‘making money from nothing’ on the ‘money-go-round’, it is
not simply the case, then, that money ﬂows outwards from the state to the bank
accounts of civil servants and thereafter trickles further downwards and outwards
to credit providers, both formal and informal. Things are more complicated, in
that the most regular loan turnovers are offered by mashonisas, many themselves
in state employ, who are ‘reinvesting’ their state salaries (or, in the case of small-
scale lenders, their grants) in order to make these grow yet further. The line
between borrowers and lenders that is blurred in some senses, hardens into a more
deﬁnite division between them at the extreme ends of the scale. One needs a steady
stream of income (a state salary, or income grant), not only to get into debt, but
also – conversely – to procure the basis for growing and expanding an income
based on other’s indebtedness.
Has the National Credit Act, with its twin aims of disciplining borrowers and
curbing the excesses of lenders, affected such processes? Its consequences for the
activities of the iniquitous furniture stores, or on those of the burgeoning new
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microﬁnance businesses that made such a killing in the ﬁrst few years after the
interest rate cap was removed, have been relatively small. In a minority of cases, a
bank or microlender has been found guilty in court of ‘reckless lending’ and a
borrower’s debt cancelled as a result. But the majority of big ﬁrms have been able
to hire the best lawyers, whereas debt counsellors are often poorly paid and
unable to beneﬁt from legal representation in court (see du Plessis 2007). But the
Act has had even less effect on the activities of informal borrowers and lenders.
If an indebted person goes to a debt counsellor, as recommended in the Act,
their various creditors – furniture stores, vehicle ﬁnance companies, banks and
microlenders – can be contacted by email or letter to suggest alternative schemas
for repayment. In contrast, loans from mashonisas are subject to no such
negotiation. The only thing a debt counsellor can advise is to ‘pay it off and walk
away’.11
In this respect, informal and formal lenders seem to differ markedly. But in
other ways the differences between informal and formal creditors are not as
marked as they might seem. The readiness with which both are able to reach into
one’s bank account and take the money owed –whether with conﬁscated ATM
cards or ‘garnishee’ orders –make them almost indistinguishable in the eyes of the
overindebted. Daphney Neke, an NGO community education ofﬁcer, told me
how many people had been driven simply to abandon their bank accounts and to
open new ones: a practice that had become endemic and was often repeated as
creditors continued to pursue them from one account to the next.12 There is, then,
little difference between the informal/illegal moneylender and the formal/legal
furniture store or microﬁnance business which ensures repayments directly from a
borrower’s account.
CONCLUSION
This article has criticized some of the assumptions that underpin policy measures
taken to regulate microﬁnance and other lending practices in South Africa,
focusing in particular on loans from informal moneylenders. Explaining their
ineffectiveness, it is not simply that ‘that law has not reached the Lowveld’ or ‘the
township’, as some maintain, but also that informalization has intensiﬁed as
11Interview, Sisinyana Pholo, Midrand, 15 April 2010.
12‘We have 1.2 million to 1.3 million public servants at the national and provincial level.
We found that 210,000 public servants are now affected by garnishee orders,’ claimed a recent
report (‘Low savings “a concern” ’), <http://www.ﬁn24.com/articles/default/display_article.aspx?
ArticleId=1518-2386-2432_25412892009/07/23 03:40:00 PM>, accessed 7 August 2010. See also
GTZ 2008, in which a research team of legal academics from the University of Pretoria, led by
Frans Haupt, was commissioned by the German Development Funding Agency to investigate the
corrosive effects of this practice on the ‘wellness’ of the workforce at the BMW factory. Their
research revealed some shifty practices, including employees being put under pressure by their
employers to sign a ‘consent to judgement’ – a necessary procedure before a clerk of the court will
allow a garnishee order to be put on an account; the forging of signatures by debt collection
agents who were paid on commission; the signing of documents by witnesses but not by the party
to be ‘garnished’; debt collectors deliberately obtaining consent to judgement in a Magistrate’s
Court hundreds of kilometres from where either the employer or the employee is based, making it
impossible to have the order rescinded without incurring huge travel costs, and the like.
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various means have been devised to tap into state resources. Neo-liberal means
serve to ensure the ever-wider spread of redistribution, but with the apparent
result, ultimately, of concentrating resources in the hands of fewer.
One point of view has it that debt and credit relationships are essential to
progress and growth, and indeed to capitalism itself (N. Ferguson 2008) – or, in a
more Foucauldian sense, ‘productive’ of state-like arrangements (Roitman 2003).
Taking a similarly positive perception, borrowers themselves invariably point to
the fact that moneylenders are ‘doing a service’, that they are the friends rather
than mere ‘clients’ of such lenders (Krige 2011: 146), and that they, the borrowers,
are to blame for their neediness. At the same time, the inexorable ‘formalization’
of people’s relations, especially to these bigger loansharks, does make for un-
sustainability, and for social and psychological damage. In this sense, indebted-
ness constitutes a deﬁnite ‘harm’ rather than something facilitative or fruitful.
The point of view that bemoans debt as damaging is the one that predominates
in policy circles in post-1994 South Africa. Such a view appears not only to
repudiate the positive perspective just mentioned, but also to underplay the
negotiability and personal ties of relatedness which often characterize informal
ﬁnancial relations in settings more marginal to mainstream capitalism (see
Guerin, Morvant-Roux and Servet 2010; Shipton 2007, 2009). My article has
shown that some of the practices of ‘ﬁnancial informality’ that these authors
describe for poorer and/or rural people are indeed, in South Africa, percolating
upwards to be drawn on by the ‘newly becoming rich’. But Guerin et al. warn
against the danger of ‘idealizing’ such relationships and practices (2010). In the
case of the larger moneylenders who draw money out of people’s accounts, forms
of social collateral like trust are simply not required. Instead, the system relies
upon the inexorable and unstoppable ﬂow of money, mostly from the state into
the bank accounts that so many are now enjoined to use. The voluntary yielding
up to the moneylender of the ATM card by its owner is serving irrevocably to
‘formalize’ credit relations. It is this that substantiates my earlier claim: that
previously personalized and morally laden forms of relationship, often regarded
in terms of long-term investment in social relations, are tending – albeit with a
veneer of social embeddedness – to change into cash-based ones.
To sum up: the categories invented and surveys conducted by market
researchers and advertisers cannot be assumed to reﬂect the nuanced reality of
consumer experience or to expose in full the character of indebtedness. Nor can
solutions based on these stark ﬁgures be effective in solving this problem. Many
who are assumed to have been plunged into debt with the advent of democracy
had been involved in relationships of debt over several generations of family
history; many who have achieved rapid mobility (and many who have not) have a
sober and prudent attitude to matters of investment and are all too aware of the
need to save money where possible. Rather than requiring ‘ﬁnancial literacy’
classes, they know what kinds of investments might bring returns in the longer
term. At the same time, however, considerable obstacles exist to moving up
the ladder at a slow and steady pace. Property relationships continue to be
ringfenced, and other attempts to earn an income involve the kinds of strategies
commonly described as ‘rent seeking’. Lending is one such strategy often resorted
to, but many lenders are borrowers too – all are scrabbling to access the steady
trickle of funds that come from secure employment in the state.
Under such circumstances it is difﬁcult to get off the money-go-round.
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ABSTRACT
Considerable attempts to create a single economy of credit, in part through
regularizing microlenders (especially the much-demonized loansharks or
mashonisas), have been made by the South African government, notably through
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the National Credit Act. This article explores how borrowing and indebtedness
are seen from the point of view of consumers and of those who aim to protect
them. It suggests that we should speak of moneylending rather than money-
lenders; that lending is often done by groups rather than by individuals (in a
variant of the well-known stokvel ); and that it may represent a response to so-
called ‘formalization’ (Guyer 2004) of ﬁnancial arrangements by those who have
considerable experience of this, rather than being a bulwark against it. Based on
research in Gauteng and Mpumalanga, the article critically explores prevalent
stereotypes of the ‘overindebted consumer’ and the ‘black diamond’, seeking
evidence both in support and in refutation of them. It discusses those factors
which are conducive to and those which obstruct the achieving of the status of
upwardly mobile – and simultaneously overindebted – person; demonstrates that
aspiration and upward mobility, and the problems of credit or debt that
accompany these, have much longer histories; and that these matters can give us
insights into the contradictory character of the South African state. Its ‘neo-
liberal’ dimension allows and encourages free engagement with the market and
advocates the freedom to spend, even to become excessively acquisitive of
material wealth. But it simultaneously attempts to regulate this in the interests of
those unable to participate in this dream of conspicuous consumption.
Informalization intensiﬁes as all manner of means are devised to tap into state
resources. Neo-liberal means are used to ensure the wide spread of redistribution.
RÉSUMÉ
Le gouvernement sud-africain a tenté à de nombreuses reprises de créer une
économie de crédit unique, à travers notamment la loi nationale sur le crédit
(National Credit Act) et la régularisation des microprêteurs (notamment les tant
diabolisés usuriers ou mashonisas). Cet article étudie le thème de l’emprunt et de
l’endettement du point de vue des consommateurs et de ceux qui cherchent à les
protéger. Il suggère que l’on devrait parler de prêt plutôt que de prêteurs, que le
prêt est souvent le fait de groupes plutôt que de personnes (variante du bien connu
stokvel) et qu’il peut représenter une réponse à la prétendue « formalisation »
(Guyer 2004) du système ﬁnancier de la part de ceux qui en ont une grande
expérience, plutôt qu’un rempart. Basé sur des recherches menées dans le
Gauteng et le Mpumalanga, l’article présente une étude critique des stéréotypes
répandus du « consommateur surendetté » et du « diamant noir », en recherchant
des éléments permettant de les justiﬁer ou de les réfuter. Il traite des facteurs qui
prédisposent une personne à accéder à l’ascension sociale (et dans le même temps
à l’endettement) ou l’en empêchent ; il démontre que l’aspiration et l’ascension
sociale, ainsi que les problèmes de crédit ou de dette qui les accompagnent,
remontent à bien plus longtemps ; enﬁn, il afﬁrme que ces éléments peuvent nous
apporter des éclairages sur le caractère contradictoire de l’État sud-africain. Sa
dimension « néolibérale » permet et encourage à participer librement au marché
et prône la liberté de dépenser, voire de devenir excessivement attaché à la richesse
matérielle. Or, dans le même temps, il tente de réguler cet aspect dans l’intérêt de
ceux qui ne peuvent pas participer au rêve de posséder des signes extérieurs de
richesse. L’informalisation s’intensiﬁe alors que l’on imagine toutes sortes de
moyens pour exploiter les ressources de l’État. Une large redistribution est assurée
à l’aide de moyens néolibéraux.
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